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ABSTRACT
We use data on the extent to which residents of one country hold the bonds of issuers resident in
another as a measure of financial integration or interrelatedness, asking how Asia compares with
Europe and Latin America and with the base case in which the purchaser and issuer of the bonds
reside in different regions.  Not surprisingly, we find that Europe is head and shoulders above other
regions in terms of financial integration.  More interesting is that Asia already seems to have made
some progress on this front compared to Latin America and other parts of the world.  The contrast
with Latin America is largely explained by stronger creditor and investor rights, more expeditious
and  less  costly  contract  enforcement,  and  greater  transparency  that  lead  to  larger  and  better
developed financial systems in Asia, something that is conducive to foreign participation in local
markets and to intra-regional cross holdings of Asian bonds generally.  Further results based on a
limited sample suggest that one factor holding back investment in foreign bonds in East Asia may
be limited geographical diversification by mutual funds, in turn reflecting a dearth of appropriate
assets.  Asian Bond Fund 2, by creating a passively managed portfolio of local currency bonds
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1.  Introduction 
  Bond market development is high on the policy agenda in East Asia, with the Asian 
Bond Fund, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, and a range of related policy initiatives.
2  
Building bond markets is designed to free Asian economies from excessive dependence on 
bank intermediation and to foster the development of a more diversified and efficient 
financial sector.  One can think of the desired results as having both domestic and 
international dimensions.  Domestically, banks have the weakness of being closely connected 
to business and political leaders but also the strength of long-standing relationships with 
borrowers, enabling them to bridge information gaps that might otherwise impede lending 
and borrowing.  Bond markets have the opposite strengths and weaknesses: transactions are 
at arm’s length, often between anonymous buyers and sellers, but access to the bond market 
                                                 
1 University of California and International Monetary Fund, respectively. The views expressed are 
those of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive 
Board or its management.  This draft is a revision of a paper prepared for the East Asian Seminar on 
Macroeconomics, Kona, Hawaii, 22-24 June 2006. 
2 The Asian Bond Fund (ABF) launched by the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central 
Banks (EMEAP) in June 2003 is designed to catalyze the growth of Asian bond markets by allocating 
a portion of the reserves of regional central banks to purchases of government and quasi-government 
securities.  The initial $1 billion of investments, known as ABF-I, was devoted exclusively to Asian 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign issues of dollar-denominated bonds.  ABF-II is twice as large and 
includes bonds denominated in regional currencies.  It has two components: a $1 billion central bank 
reserve pool to be overseen by professional managers for local bond allocation, and a $1 billion index 
unit designed to list on eight stock exchanges beginning with Hong Kong in 2005.  The latter is 
designed to facilitate one-stop entry for retail and institutional buyers as well as providing a 
benchmark structure for tracking pan-Asian performance.  The Asian Bond Markets Initiative 
(AMBI), endorsed by ASEAN+3 finance ministers at their meeting in Manila in August 2003, is 
designed to foster an active and liquid secondary market in local-currency bonds and to develop the 
infrastructure needed for the growth of local bond markets, mainly through the activity of six working 
groups and a focal group intended to coordinate their activities.   - 2 - 
 
as a source of finance is available only to the largest, longest-established firms about whom 
the best information is available.  Given the existence of long-standing relationships between 
banks and their clients, the banking system is ideally placed to provide patient finance for 
investments subject to limited uncertainty but long gestation periods.  Bond markets, in 
contrast, are the channel through which creditors lend to enterprises investing in rival 
technologies, not all of which will pay off even with sufficient time.  Such are the arguments 
that a financially mature economy should have diversified sources of finance, including both 
an efficient banking system and a well developed bond market. 
  The international dimension emphasizes that bond markets may have advantages over 
banks as channels for capital flows.  Banks value liquidity, given that some of their funds are 
raised by offering demand deposits; it follows that bank loans are generally of shorter 
maturity than bond issues, and the short maturity of foreign liabilities is a notorious problem 
for countries borrowing abroad (Goldstein and Turner 2004).  Banks being too big to fail, 
market discipline may be weak when such institutions are on the borrowing and/or lending 
side of the capital flow.  These qualms about bank intermediation of capital flows provided 
an important part of the impetus for the Asian Bond Fund and the Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative. 
  In a previous study (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2004), we asked how Asia 
was doing along the domestic dimension – how Asia compared to other regions and how 
individual Asian countries compared to economies with broadly similar characteristics 
elsewhere in the world in terms of the depth of domestic markets.  Here we provide a 
complementary analysis of the international aspect.  We assess bond markets as a conduit for 
capital flows (more precisely, as a conduit for cumulated capital flows, that is, stocks).    - 3 - 
 
Using bilateral data we analyze the importance of a range of factors determining nonresident 
holdings of a country’s bonds, which permits us to compare cross-country holdings in Asia 
with cross-country holdings in other regions, as well as analyzing the determinants of 
holdings across regions.  This allows us to gauge the extent of bond market integration and 
how it compares across regions and over time.
3   
The vehicle for this analysis (as some readers will have guessed given use of the word 
“bilateral” in the preceding sentence) is the gravity model, which provides a natural 
framework for analyzing trade in financial assets (as well as trade in goods).  An advantage 
of this framework is that it is straightforward to compare the results with previous gravity-
model-based studies of the determinants of cross-border capital flows mediated by 
international banks.
4 
The basic framework explains cross-country bond holdings well.  The results point to 
the significant regionalization of bond markets in the sense that investors are most inclined to 
hold the bonds of other countries in their same region.  Not surprisingly this phenomenon is 
most extensive in Europe: compared to the base case where the investors and the issuing 
country are in different regions, Europeans hold significantly larger bond-market claims on 
                                                 
3 In principle, one could analyze the integration of bond markets on a number of other dimensions, for 
example the convergence of interest rates and spreads.  Similarly, one would measure bond market 
development not just in terms of market capital capitalization but also liquidity (turnover), bid-ask 
spreads, and a number of other measures.  Unfortunately, data on these other dimensions are more 
limited and fragmentary and thus do not permit as extensive an analysis as we undertake here 
(although data on stock market capitalization, utilized below, can be thought of as providing at least 
an indirect indication of financial market liquidity).  For further discussion, see our 2004 study, and 
for an analysis of liquidity and spreads that expressly compares Asia with Latin America, see 
Eichengreen, Borensztein and Panizza (2006). 
4 This literature is surveyed below, in Section 2.   - 4 - 
 
one another.  We would be alarmed and begin to question our methodology if we did not find 
this, since the single market, the euro and subsequent efforts at regulatory harmonization 
provide powerful explanations for this pattern.  More striking is that cross holdings are also 
greater within Asia than across regions when we control for the basic arguments of the 
gravity model.  Bond market integration in Asia may have significantly further to go before it 
reaches European levels or meets the expectations of regional officials, but our results 
suggest that there has already been some progress.
5   
A number of our results also caution that bond markets are not a panacea for 
countries seeking to tame volatile capital flows.  They indicate that bond-market transactions 
are heavily influenced by financial conditions in the investing country, in turn suggesting that 
emerging economies utilizing bond markets to access foreign finance can suffer disruptions 
for reasons largely beyond their control.  This was a conclusion of the literature analyzing 
early post-Brady Plan bond flows to emerging markets (see e.g. Calvo, Liederman and 
Reinhart 1993); it is timely again in 2006, when questions have been raised about whether 
flows into local bond markets reflect better fundamentals in emerging-market economies or 
simply the fact that the advanced economies are awash with liquidity.
6  Our results also 
                                                 
5 A contrasting case is Latin America, where we find that bond market integration, so measured, is 
even less than is typical of pairs of countries located in different parts of the world.  This result is 
fully explained, it turns out, by the weakness of institutions in Latin American countries, which 
continues to discourage foreign investors in the region (as well as foreign investors outside) from 
holding their bonds – and which is associated with financial underdevelopment generally.  Thus, 
Eichengreen, Borensztein and Panizza (2006) compare bond market development in Asia and Latin 
America and show that Asian countries rank significantly higher in terms of cost and reliability of 
contract enforcement, compliance with international accounting standards, etc. 
6 Empirical evidence that both sets of factors are at work is in Buchanan (2005) and Borensztein, 
Eichengreen and Panizza (2006a).   - 5 - 
 
indicate that that bondholders are attracted to the securities of countries whose returns co-
vary positively with their own; this result would seem to support return-chasing rather than 
diversification motives for holding foreign bonds.  This evidence of limited diversification 
again raises questions about the prospective stability of the market. 
Section 2 starts with a review of previous studies, after which we introduce the data in 
Section 3.  Section 4 reports the basic results, while Section 5 examines their robustness.  In 
Section 6 we turn to the key issue of how cross-holdings of bonds within Asia and globally 
are related to the development of national financial systems.  This leads us in Section 7 to the 
role institutional investors (banks, insurance companies and mutual funds).  Section 8 
reiterates the main findings and draws out their policy implications. 
   
2.  Review of Previous Studies 
       There are now substantial theoretical and empirical literatures using the gravity model 
to analyze bilateral commodity trade.  Why the size and distance between importing and 
exporting countries should successfully explain patterns of merchandise trade is intuitive: 
country size is a proxy for the both the supply and demand for tradeable goods, while 
distance between the trading partners has is correlated with transport costs.  More recently 
there has developed a rapidly growing if still largely unpublished literature using the gravity 
model to explain trade in assets.
7  In that context the meaning of the distance variable is less 
                                                 
7 In contrast to the substantial literature on bank-intermediated flows and the growing literature on 
equity flows, studies of the bond market – our particular concern in this paper – utilizing this 
framework are relatively few and far between.   - 6 - 
 
straightforward.
8  Physical transport costs are negligible in this case; more likely is that 
distance to a country is correlated with availability of information about its financial 
instruments and the determinants of their performance (investors are likely to know more 
about these things in neighboring countries to which travel is relatively cheap).  This 
perspective suggests augmenting the traditional distance measure with more direct proxies 
for ease of information flows, such as bilateral telephone traffic and imports and exports of 
newspapers and periodicals.  
There is some theoretical basis for these relationships.. Martin and Rey (2004) show 
that if markets for financial assets are segmented, cross-border asset trade entails transaction 
or information costs, and the supply of assets is endogeneous, then bilateral asset holdings 
are positively related to the size of the markets, negatively related to the transaction or 
information costs, and positively related to expected returns of the assets.
9  Using a similar 
theoretical model, Faraqee, Li and Yan (2004) also show that the gravity equation emerges 
naturally.  While these models are developed for equity investment, one can show that the 
results can be applied for risky bond investments. 
       A.  Studies using data on bank claims.  From the early 1980s the Bank for 
International Settlements has provided information on the international claims of BIS-
reporting banks.  Banks reporting to the BIS tend to be larger and more internationally-active 
than the typical commercial bank, a form of selectivity that should be taken into account in 
                                                 
8 We return to this below. 
9 This assumption is consistent with the views that financial assets are imperfect substitutes as they 
insure against different risks. 
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interpreting the finding of studies utilizing this source.
10  This measure of international bank 
lending is organized by the country of origin of the bank extending the claims (specifically, 
the country in which the head office of the reporting bank is located).
11  The underlying 
information is drawn from supervisory and statistical returns of the countries in which the 
banks are headquartered.  Data are broken down by the national destination of the loans.  
The first studies to use these data of which we are aware are by Claudia Buch.  Buch 
(2000a) uses BIS consolidated data for one year, 1999, and limits her source countries to 
France, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK, and US (while distinguishing 75 destination countries).  The 
most important determinant of the extent of cross border lending is financial development in 
the destination country (as measured by the ratio of bank credit to GDP).  Curiously, the 
presence or absence of capital controls does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
extent of lending.  In a follow-up study, Buch (2000b) then uses BIS consolidated claims 
data for the longer period 1983-99.  In addition to the standard gravity variables, she includes 
in her specification the volume of bilateral trade (which enters positively and significantly, 
where lagged trade is used as an instrument for current trade). 
12  She also considers a 
                                                 
10 A not unrelated fact is that country coverage has expanded over time.  At most recent report banks 
and other lending institutions in some 30 jurisdictions contribute to the construction of the BIS data. 
11 This is in contrast to the BIS’s locational data (not published on the institution’s website), which 
distinguishes banks by location rather than nationality.  Arguably, the consolidated data are more 
relevant for studies of financial integration insofar as they focus on both the cross-border and within-
destination-country lending activities of foreign-headquartered banks. 
12 Rose and Spiegel (2004) focus on the connections between trade and lending as well.  Their 
strongest finding is that an increase in trade is associated with an increase in bilateral bank lending.  
They instrument trade with distance and therefore do not include distance as an explanatory variable 
for lending.  They also use a common language dummy and a regional trade agreement dummy.  An 
alternative approach is that of Aviat and Coeurdacier (2005), who use 2001 BIS data.  They estimate 
two simultaneous equations for trade in goods and trade in assets (using transport costs – UPS 
(continued)   - 8 - 
 
dummy for OECD membership as a measure of the differential effects of the Basle Accord 
(which enters positively), the Grilli-Milesi-Ferretti capital controls measure (which has a 
negative but quantitatively small impact on cross border bank claims), the share of the 
banking system that is government owned (which affects cross border lending negatively), 
and a measure of exchange rate volatility (which has no discernible effect on the volume of 
cross-border lending).   
Kawai and Liu (2001) use BIS data for the period 1985-2000.  They consider 10 
OECD source countries and a sample of developing country destinations.  Unlike other 
studies, they do not pool the annual data for successive years but consider a series of 16 cross 
sections.  Like Buch, they find that trade flows encourage cross-border banking lending.  In 
addition, the volume of bank-related inflows declines with measures of consumption and 
rises with the credit rating of the recipient country (especially after 1996, suggesting a 
growing sensitivity to credit-quality-related considerations). Countries receiving more 
bilateral foreign aid also receive more bank loans from the same source.  In contrast to 
Buch’s earlier conclusion, the authors find that a more volatile exchange rate discourages 
bank lending (this coefficient is consistently negative though not always significant).  The 
interest differential between the source and destination country has no consistent effect. 
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) study lending flows from OECD countries to 10 emerging 
markets.  Their principal findings include that aggregate flows are procyclical with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                       
shipping rates – as an instrument for trade in goods and hence omitting it from the trade in assets 
equation).  In addition, they compute the correlation of the average gross return on equity in the two 
countries.  Interestingly, they find the same thing we do when we consider bonds below: a higher 
correlation leads to more claims (they refer to this as the “correlation puzzle”).  Another study that 
reaches the same result is Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2005).   - 9 - 
 
growth in the lending countries.  They find a positive correlation between fixed exchange 
rates and bank lending (reinforcing the earlier finding of Kawai and Liu).  Ferrucci (2004) 
studies BIS-reporting banks’ lending to 19 emerging markets, and distinguishes 6 advanced 
lending countries.  The results support the significance of business cycles in the borrowing 
country (but not in the lending country, which is contrary to Jeanneau and Micu), bilateral 
exchange rate variability (which reduces lending), the overall level of indebtedness of the 
borrower (which again reduces lending), bilateral trade (which enters positively), global 
equity returns (which enter negatively), and the yield spread between low and high rated US 
corporate bonds as a measure of risk tolerance (which enters negatively). 
The most recent wave of studies (Eichengreen and Park 2005, Kim, Lee and Shin 
2005) focuses on comparisons between Asia and Europe.  To shed more light on intra-Asian 
flows, Eichengreen and Park (2005) supplement the BIS data with unpublished data for 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea.
13  Banks are distinguished by nationality rather 
than location.  They find that cross border bank claims are smaller in Asia than in Europe.  
The standard gravity variables explain some but by no means all of this difference.  The 
remainder is explained by policy variables: more intra-regional trade in Europe makes for 
more financial flows; past capital controls influence current claims; and less developed 
financial markets (as measured by bank credit as a share of GDP) make for fewer flows.  
Kim, Lee and Shin (2005) augment the BIS data base with data for Korea. Unlike 
Eichengreen and Park, they report results suggesting that there is no remaining significant 
difference between the volume of intra-European and intra-East Asian flows once one 
                                                 
13 Obtained from the national authorities in each country.   - 10 - 
 
controls for the standard gravity models.  This may however reflect their limited 
geographical coverage for Asia. 
The most comprehensive study in this vein is Papaioannou (2005), who uses BIS 
locational banking data from the mid-1980s through 2002.  Standard gravity variables 
perform as expected, but there is also a role for ICRG political risk ratings, in that recent 
declines in country risk in developing countries have led to a significant increase in cross-
border bank claims, other things equal.  Papaioannou then tries to unbundle this variable by 
substituting bureaucratic quality (which discourages foreign bank investment), time required 
to complete a legal case (which has a significant negative effect on cross border bank 
claims), and government ownership of the banking system (which has a significant negative 
effect).  When political risk is reintroduced, it matters as well (“politics and institutions are 
both key determinants of international capital transactions”).  Papaioannou also considers the 
Reinhart-Rogoff de facto classification of exchange rate regimes and finds that foreign banks 
prefer investing in countries with more stable exchange rates. 
Finally, Liu (2005) uses BIS data to test for the significance of General Agreement on 
Trade and Services (GATS) commitments – which are highly significant in his specification.  
In contrast to other studies, he finds no effect of exchange rate volatility or the presence of 
capital controls. 
B.  Studies using data on equity markets.  An early contribution to the literature on 
international equity transactions is Ghosh and Wolf (2000), who consider flows from 
Germany, Italy, the UK and the U.S. to nine recipient countries.  They include only the basic 
gravity variables, finding that most of these perform reasonably well.  Portes and Rey (2005), 
in a more comprehensive effort, consider bilateral equity purchases and sales between 14   - 11 - 
 
source and destination countries in the period 1989-1996.
14  They compare the performance 
of two measures of information costs: distance and telephone traffic.  The number of bank 
branches in country i of banks headquartered in country j consistently matters, as if banks 
and equity-market flows are complements rather than substitutes.   They use market 
capitalization in the source and destination countries as a measure of market size.  
Interestingly (and in contrast to our results for bonds below), destination country returns do 
not appear to matter. 
Izquierdo, Morriset and Olarreaga (2003) use the same data as Portes and Rey (2005) 
for a similar period (1990-1996).   They again use bilateral telephone traffic as a measure of 
information flows but also consider bilateral trade in newspapers and periodicals; by 
distinguishing imports and exports of newspapers they can say something about the direction 
of the information flow. Their most important finding, which is somewhat counterintuitive, is 
that information flowing from the source to the destination country matters most for bilateral 
equity flows (newspaper exports from the U.S. to Argentina matter more than newspaper 
exports from Brazil to the U.S. in explaining U.S. purchases of Brazilian equities).  They 
interpret this as an indication of the importance of information about the liquidity of the U.S. 
market.
15 
                                                 
14 The data are from Cross-Border Capital.  Their Asian countries include Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
15 In addition they attempt to identify the relationship between trade flows and financial flows, using 
import and export taxes as instruments in the commodity trade equation and stock market 
capitalization as an instrument in the equities trade equation; the two relationships are estimated 
simultaneously.   - 12 - 
 
  C.  Studies using data on bonds.  Studies concerned with bond markets, our focus in 
this paper, are few and far between.  Ghosh and Wolf (2000), in the same study noted in 
Subsection B above, estimate the impact of the basic gravity variables on debt outflows from 
Germany, the U.S. and Italy to a number of different destinations.  Interestingly, these 
estimates do not appear to fit the data particularly well, except in the case of the United 
States.  Buch (2000b) uses IMF data on debt securities for 1997 only.  In her study the basic 
gravity variables are well behaved and look similar to those in regressions for bank claims.
16  
The impact of having a larger domestic banking system is ambiguous, with the sign of the 
effect varying by source country).  Finally, coefficients on the ratio of bank loans to total 
debt finance suggest that the relative importance of bond finance rises with the financial 
development of the host country, while country (population) size is otherwise insignificant, 
suggesting minimal economies of scale.
17 
  Thus, the few previous studies that have utilized the gravity model to study the bond 
market raise as many questions as they answer.  In what follows we therefore see whether we 
can push this literature forward another step. 
 
                                                 
16 Suggesting in turn that the relatively poor results in the study by Ghosh and Wolf reflect the very 
limited nature of their sample. 
17 In the study otherwise closest to our own, Kim, Lee and Shin (2005) use IMF data on total portfolio 
claims (portfolio equity, debt securities and bank claims) rather than just bonds for 1997 and 2001 
through 2004.  They find that trade is positively associated with financial integration.  When trade 
variable is added, the dummy variable indicating that both the source and recipient country are in East 
Asia goes to zero.  They also include a variable for whether one of the pair is a global financial center 
and find that this matters strongly for Asia, as if countries in the region are more heavily linked with 
global financial centers than with one another. 
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3.  Data and Specification 
  The dependent variable in our analysis is the log of bilateral international portfolio 
holdings of long-term debt securities from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS) compiled by the IMF for the years 2001-2003.
18  The purpose of the survey is to 
collect information on the stock of cross-border holdings of equities, long-term debt 
securities, and short-term debt securities, all valued at market prices and broken down by the 
economy of residence of the issuer.  Central bank reserve holdings are excluded.
19  
  To date, the IMF has released five waves of CPIS data.
20  The first wave was for end-
1997; 29 economies participated. The second through fourth waves were released annually 
from end-2001 through end-2003.  The number of countries participating tended to rise over 
time; 69 economies participated in 2003.  For each participating economy, the survey reports 
holdings in all destination economies. The list of reporting economies appears in the 
appendix. For this study we create an unbalanced panel using data for 2001-2003.
21 
                                                 
18 To avoid the problem of log of zero, we use natural logs of (1 + the variable).  The data set and data 
description are available on the internet at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ pi/cpis.htm. 
19 Thus, our results concerning the determinants of such positions should be understood as reflecting 
the investment decisions of private agents and, where appropriate, government agencies with foreign 
holdings.  Although central bank reserves are excluded from the CPIS data, it still could be that large 
reserves are signal that exchange rates will be relatively stable, capital markets will remain open, and 
liquidity will be ensured through backstopping operations.  In the section on sensitivity analysis 
below, we therefore add reserves in both the sending and receiving countries to our baseline 
specification. 
20 Since the first draft of this paper was written, the fifth wave of CPIS data has been released, but the 
amount of information made publicly available, especially at the disaggregated level, is still limited.  
We prefer to wait for the complete data set before extending our analysis. 
21 We drop the 1997 data since the smaller and less representative sample would likely aggravate 
problems of selectivity (addressed below).   - 14 - 
 
  In designing this survey the IMF has attempted to ensure comprehensiveness and 
consistency across countries.  All national surveys are conducted simultaneously, use 
consistent definitions, and are structured to encourage the use of best practices in data 
collection.  Specific procedures are recommended to minimize the danger of 
misclassification and double counting.  For example, the issuance of depository receipts 
creates the potential for double counting since there will then exist two securities that can be 
reported as held but only one underlying liability.
 22 Depository receipts are therefore 
recorded by looking through the financial institution that issues the receipts; instead the 
holder of the receipts are taken to have a claim on the underlying asset.  In this case 
American depository receipts (ADRs) are recorded as liabilities of the non-U.S. enterprise 
whose securities underlie the ADR issue and not of the U.S. financial institution that issues 
the ADRs. 
  Despite all this, there are problems with the CPIS (see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2003).  These include (i) incomplete country coverage, as some large holders of portfolio 
assets, such as China, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have not participated in the 
survey; (ii) under-reporting of assets by CPIS participants due to incomplete institutional 
coverage; (iii) third party holding, as the survey responses in some countries may be based on 
custodians instead of end-investors;  and (iv) problems with collection methods, especially 
for those participating in the survey for the first time.  The exclusion of China may be 
consequential for comparisons of Asia with other regions, although we would note that flows 
                                                 
22 Depository receipts are securities that represent ownership of securities held by a depository. 
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from other Asian countries responding to the survey to China are included in our analysis.
23  
Note that we are unable to analyze separately the determinants of cross-border holdings of 
corporate bonds and government bonds, since the CPIS reports only data on the sum of the 
two.
24  Nor do we have information on the currency composition of bilateral holdings. 
The years 2001-3, spanned by our survey data, were special ones in international 
financial markets.  The beginning of this period was disturbed by default in Argentina and 
financial difficulties in Turkey, while its end was dominated by low global interest rates and 
surging cross-border investment.
25  It is not clear in what direction these particular conditions 
might influence our estimates of the coefficients of interest.  Still, it will clearly be important 
to include year fixed effects or to apply equivalent treatments to prevent our results from 
being contaminated by temporal effects. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of the CPIS data by region of source and 
destination countries. Table 1 shows the average amount of cross-border bond holdings 
                                                 
23 Also, since central bank holdings of foreign bonds are not included in the aggregates analyzed here, 
as noted above, the fact that China is not included is somewhat less troubling. In addition to China, 
some readers may also concern about the results because of the exclusion of Indian resident’s 
holdings of foreign debt securities from the sample. According to the IMF’s International Investment 
Position Statistics, India invested US$300-400 million in foreign portfolio debt securities during the 
sample period. The exclusion of bond investment from India should affect the results only marginally. 
24 Doing otherwise would violate the IMF’s commitment to keep confidential the information it 
obtains on the composition of individual central banks’ foreign reserves, where central banks so 
require.  Other evidence (such as that reported in Eichengreen, Borensztein and Panizza 2006) 
suggests that the cross-border holdings analyzed here predominantly take the form of government 
bonds. We are however able, in our companion paper, to analyze the determinants of domestic market 
capitalization (as opposed to regional and global bond market integration, our focus here) separately 
for corporate and government bonds. 
25 Note, however, that 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, when emerging market spreads fell to 
unprecedentedly low levels and enormous volumes of capital flowed into emerging markets as a 
corollary of the so-called “carry trade,” are not included in our sample period.   - 16 - 
 
during the sample period. It is not surprising that the cross-border holdings of long-term debt 
securities are the highest within the European Union, as the region’s financial integration and 
financial development are relatively more advanced. While Asian countries hold a large sum 
of foreign bonds issued by countries outside the region, their holdings of bonds issued by 
countries within the region are relatively small. Latin America, on the other hand, holds only 
a small position of foreign debt securities, and the intra-regional holdings are smaller than 
those of Asia. Table 2 shows cross-border bond investment in percent of the total bonds 
outstanding of the destination region.
26 In other words, the table shows the share of each 
region’s debt securities outstanding held by foreign investors as reported by the CPIS. The 
share of intra-regional bond holdings in Asia appears to be smaller than in Latin America 
because of its larger amount of bonds outstanding.  
  Our empirical strategy is to estimate the gravity model, augmented by various control 
variables.  Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 






w z ￿ x ￿ w ￿ ) distance ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ij 3 2 1  
 
where i denotes the source; j denotes the destination country of bond investments; and t 
denotes time, which spans from 2001-2003 in the sample. bondijt is the cross-border holdings 
of long term debt securities from country i to country j at time t. it w  is a vector of source 
                                                 
26 The total bond outstanding is the sum of domestic and international debt securities from BIS 
securities debt statistics.   - 17 - 
 
country-specific explanatory variables,  it x  is a vector of destination country-specific 
explanatory variables, and  it z   is a vector of bilateral explanatory variables. The descriptions 
and sources of these explanatory variables are listed in the appendix. Finally, ijt e  is an error 
term, which can be specified differently depending on the estimation method. For example, 
in an OLS model,  ijt e  would be independently and identically distributed  ) , 0 (
2
e s IID . If we 
assume a destination country fixed effects model,  ijt j ijt v u + = e , where  j u  is constant for 
each destination country and  ijt v  is independently and identically distributed  ) , 0 (
2
v IID s . In a 
random effects model,  j u  would be drawn from  ) , 0 (
2
u IID s  where  j u  and all explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with  ijt v . 
   
4.  Basic Results 
To implement the gravity model, we will start with ordinary least squares, then add 
destination-country random effects and fixed effects (where the latter forces us to eliminate 
time-invariant recipient country variables), and finally use country-pair fixed effects (forcing 
us to drop country pair variables that do not vary over time). 
As shown in Table 4, the basic gravity variables (country size, log of distance, land 
border dummy, common language dummy) behave well in our pooled OLS specifications. In 
Table 5 we add recipient country fixed and random effects. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test suggests that that random effects are preferred to pooled OLS, and   - 18 - 
 
Hausman’s specification test prefers fixed effects to random effects. Table 6 reports the 
baseline results using country-pair random effects model.
27  
We find, similar to results in the literature, that country size matters: larger countries 
invest more in other countries’ bonds; at the same time, larger countries attract more bond 
investment from other countries. The results are similar whether we measure country size by 
GDP, land area, or population.  Distance between countries enters negatively, consistent with 
the information-cost hypothesis. The coefficients on the land border dummy are positive but 
not robust. This implies that contiguity is a less important determinant of information and 
transaction costs for finance than trade (which makes sense in that physical transportation 
costs, which are often minimized by contiguity, matter more for the latter). 
The interest rate variables highlight the importance of push factors: investments do 
not always go to the countries with higher interest rates, but they clearly come from countries 
with lower interest rates.
28  We find the same when we instead use the average monthly 
return on home country bonds and the average monthly return on foreign country bonds in 
home country currency (Table 7).
29  (We interpret the average monthly return as the 
                                                 
27 Again, the LM test rejects the null hypothesis of pooled OLS. The results with fixed effects are not 
reported, as we are forced to drop all country-pair, time-invariant variables (e.g. distance, intra-
regional dummy variables), many of which are of particular interest. 
28 We use the differences between LIBOR rate and domestic interest rates as the independent 
variables to control for changes in global interest rates. A positive coefficient on LIBOR - source 
country’s interest rate implies that cross-border holdings are higher for source countries with lower 
interest rates. 
29  We measure past bond returns using total return indices, taking into account changes in bilateral 
exchange rates by using own-currency returns for source countries and source-country-currency 
returns for destination countries. For emerging market countries, we use J.P. Morgan’s Emerging 
Market Bond Indices (EMBI) total return indices, which compute total returns (capital gains and 
interest returns) on U.S. dollar-denominated debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-
(continued)   - 19 - 
 
historical or backward-looking return and the interest differential as the contemporaneous or 
forward-looking return.)  These results are consistent with accounts emphasizing the 
importance of global factors and conditions in the financial centers as determinants of 
conditions in emerging markets (see e.g. Calvo 1999).  They are suggestive for a paper 
presented in the summer of 2006, since the first half of the year has been marked by 
substantial flows into emerging market bonds and, in turn, prompted a debate over whether 
this reflects mainly improved fundamentals in the emerging markets or the low level of 
interest rates and abundant liquidity in the advanced economies.  Our results provide some 
support for the second interpretation. 
The correlation of bond returns enters positively in our equations, which is easier to 
interpret in terms of return chasing than diversification.
30  This is the “correlation puzzle” 
identified by McCauley and Jiang (2004) in their analysis of bank-intermediated flows. 
McCauley and Jiang (2004) observe that arbitrage has done little to equalize returns between 
Asian local currency bonds and their industrial-country counterparts, consistent with this 
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereign entities. For mature market countries, we use J.P. Morgan’s Government Bond Indices 
(GBI), which track total returns on local currency government debt instruments.  For source countries 
we calculate returns from its bond index and, if applicable, convert the returns into its own currency. 
For destination countries we use unhedged bond returns in source country currency to take into 
account changes in bilateral exchange rate.  In principle, it would be desirable to measure the extent 
of hedging behavior directly, perhaps using data on the existence of level of activity on hedging 
markets.  However, information on activity on such markets, and even on their existence, is available 
in systematic form only for a relatively small subset of countries. 
30  We compute the correlation of bond returns using 3-year rolling correlation of the past total bond 
returns (as described earlier).  Given expected returns and portfolio weights, the lower the correlation 
of returns on two assets, the lower the variance of they portfolio they comprise.  Hence one would 
expect a risk adverse investor to choose foreign assets with lower return correlation with their local 
portfolio in order to diversify and minimize portfolio risks.  The positive coefficient on the return 
correlation implies that investors choose foreign bonds with returns more correlated with their local 
bond portfolio.   - 20 - 
 
finding, but they also suggest that this pattern should make diversification attractive; our 
results suggest that there has been little such diversification to date. This result is also 
consistent with interpretations of recent trends emphasizing the high level of liquidity in the 
financial centers in driving flows to emerging markets as well as trend-chasing behavior as 
opposed to diversification motives.
31  
In contrast to the mixed results in studies of bank loans, for bond markets we 
consistently find that capital controls are important.
32  The regressions suggest that controls 
in both source and destination countries matter in anticipated fashion.  Controls on outflows 
from the investing country always enter with the larger coefficient (in absolute value terms), 
as if these measures are especially binding.  All this is consistent with findings in our earlier 
paper on the domestic dimension of bond market development – that capital controls are 
negatively associated with domestic bond-market capitalization. 
The volatility of the bilateral exchange rate enters with a strong negative coefficient.
33  
Again, this is consistent with our earlier analysis of domestic bond-market capitalization, 
where we found that more volatile exchange rates had a negative effect (which we interpreted 
as evidence that exchange rate volatility discourages foreign participation). 
                                                 
31 We should note that this result is also consistent with reverse causality, in the sense that larger 
cross-border investments between two countries could result in higher correlations of domestic and 
foreign returns.  
32 We use the lines for restrictions on capital transactions in bonds and other debt instruments from 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  The data are 
entered as a dummy variable where “1” means there is a restriction on capital transactions in bonds 
and other debt instrument and “0” means there is not. 
33 The volatility of the bilateral exchange rate is measured as annual standard deviation of monthly 
changes of logs of bilateral exchange rates.   - 21 - 
 
Interestingly, when we add the Asia dummy to the preceding specifications, it enters 
with a positive coefficient, as if Asian bond markets are more integrated, so measured, than a 
randomly selected pair of bond markets.
34  But this coefficient goes to zero in Table 8, where 
we include financial sector variables (domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a 
percent of GDP and stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP).  When we add an 
analogous dummy for members of the European Union (as of 2001-3), it is also positive and 
significant, and the point estimate is even larger.  In contrast to Asia, the EU dummy is not 
wiped out by adding financial sector measures. Thus, cross border participation in Europe 
appears to reflect more than simply the advanced nature of the region’s financial sector and 
the absence of capital controls; it presumably also reflects the extent of, inter alia, regulatory 
harmonization.
35 
 In Table 9, we add several proxies for the quality of institutions of the destination 
country.
36  Not surprisingly, measures of the quality of institutions in the destination country 
are consistently important in explaining cross-border holdings.  Indices measuring law and 
order, corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the investment risks (higher values mean better 
                                                 
34 The Asia dummy is equal to 1 for Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macao SAR, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand. Note that it leaves out 
Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei and Vietnam, for which data are spotty and which do not 
participate fully in the region’s entire range of financial-market initiatives. 
35 The Latin America dummy is opposite in sign.  It also tends to lose some of its statistical 
significance when we add financial sector variables, but not across the board. 
36 While these recipient-country-specific control variables are not time-invariant, the variations over 
time are small compared to cross-country variations. Results using destination country fixed effects 
model thus may not be very meaningful. As a result, we will report the results from the random 
effects model only.   - 22 - 
 
institutions) all tend to enter with positive coefficients.
37  We similarly obtain a negative 
coefficient on number of days required to enforce a contract (from Djankov et al. 2005).
38  
Even when we control for institutional quality and interest rates, credit ratings 
continue to matter.  The direction of the effect is plausible: higher ratings mean higher 
foreign holdings.  It may be that the rating agencies are capturing something in addition to 
the standard measures of institutional quality.  Or it could be that restrictive covenants 
preventing institutional investors from holding bonds of issuers with sub-investment-grade 
ratings are driving this result. 
Interestingly, the intraregional dummy variable for Latin America turns positive and 
significant when we control for the quality of institutions.  The importance of institutional 
weaknesses for various aspects of bond market development in Latin America has been 
widely remarked upon.  Thus, de la Torre and Schmuker (2004) observe that the high cost of 
judicial proceedings is a factor discouraging foreign investors from holding the bonds of a 
number of Latin American countries.  Inter-American Development Bank (2005) observes 
that Latin America fares poorly when rated on both investor and creditor rights.  In both 
cases the highest ranked Latin American country – Chile – has values according to the 
standard indices that are lower than the Asian average.  Eichengreen, Borensztein and 
                                                 
37 An exception is the corruption measure.  However, there appears to be strong colinearity between 
per capita income and the institutional variables (not surprisingly): the sign and significance of the 
latter are sensitive to whether per capita income is included (since this is associated with other hard-
to-observe dimensions of the strength of institutions).   
 
38 The measures of legal origin, which are negative for both English and French law (where Nordic 
law is the omitted alternative), are hard to reconcile with the standard La Porta et al. (1999) view.  
Recall that these same variables similarly entered with counterintuitive signs in our earlier study 
using domestic-capitalization data and that Djankov et al. (2005) also find that these variables do not 
always have the anticipated effects.  The mystery deepens.   - 23 - 
 
Panizza (2006) show that Latin American countries comply less fully with international 
accounting standards than do their Asian counterparts.  What is interesting here is that the 
low level of financial integration in Latin America is fully (indeed, more than fully) 
explained by the low quality of institutions. 
 
5.  Sensitivity Checks 
  We now provide a series of robustness checks of the results reported above.  
·  We adjust the standard errors for the fact that a number of our institutional variables 
do not vary over time by clustering on destination countries.
39  Clustering increases 
the standard errors on the institutional variables, as expected, but few of the latter 
lose their statistical significance.
40  Overall, the results are very similar to before. 
·  We check for selectivity, which may be important given that only some 70 source 
countries (of some 180-plus IMF members) participated in the CPIS surveys.  We re-
estimated the basic equations using a Heckman selectivity correction.  From the first-
stage selection equations, we find, plausibly, that countries participating in the 
survey are larger, richer and have larger banking systems and stock markets.  But 
even after controlling for these selection criteria, the results remain similar to those 
obtained before. The results are reported in Table 10. 
                                                 
39 In other words, we assume that observations are independent across destination countries but not 
necessarily within them. 
40 The results, while not reported, are available on request.    - 24 - 
 
·  We experiment with alternative measures of the de facto exchange rate regime.  
When we replace exchange rate variability, the measure used above, with dummy 
variables constructed on the basis of Reinhart and Rogoff’s exchange rate regime 
classification, the results remain basically the same.
41  We find that pegged exchange 
rates have positive effects on cross-border bond holdings (compared to floating and 
managed floating regimes), while regimes of limited flexibility enter with 
significantly negative signs.
42 See Table 11. 
·  We experiment with alternative measures of policies toward the capital account.  For 
example, we substitute the alternative measures of the absence of restrictions on all 
inflows and outflows as well as the financial openness index kindly made available 
by Nancy Brune.
43  Again, the results are largely the same.  We then substitute Chinn 
                                                 
41 We use the update through 2003 of the Reinhart and Rogoff de facto classification in Eichengreen 
and Razo-Garcia (2005).  For tractability we reclassify their more detailed classifications into 3 main 
categories: peg, limited flexibility, and floating/managed floating and assign a dummy variable for 
each category. Floating/managed floating is the alternative omitted from the regressions. 
42 These results, however, are not robust to the measures of the rate of returns. The coefficients lose 
their significance when we use historical returns instead of interest rate differential. 
43 The measure of capital openness of all inflows is the sum of five dummy variables, measuring 
respectively controls on inflows of invisible transactions, controls on inflows of export transactions, 
controls on inflows pertaining to capital and money market securities, controls on inflows pertaining 
to credit operations, and controls on inward direct investment. For each component, a value of one 
means open (no restriction) while zero means closed (restriction in place).  The resulting measure 
ranges from zero to five, where higher values imply more open capital account on inflow transactions. 
Similarly, the measure of capital openness of all outflows is the sum of four variables: controls on 
outflows of all transactions mentioned previously, except export transactions.  The resulting measure 
ranges from zero to four, where higher values imply more open capital account on outflow 
transactions.  The financial openness index is the sum of the measures of capital openness of inflows 
and outflows as well as dummy variables indicating controls on inward direct investment, controls on 
outward direct investment, controls on real estate transactions, provisions specific to commercial 
banks, and exchange rate structure (where this last variable takes on a value of zero if country has 
dual or multiple exchange rates).  The resulting index ranges from zero to 12.   - 25 - 
 
and Ito’s (2005) measure of financial openness.
44  Once again, the results are 
consistent with before: as expected, financial openness has a positive effect on 
foreign holdings of portfolio debt securities. Again, see Table 11. 
·  We add a lagged dependent variable to see whether the patterns we detect are robust 
to a model that explicitly allows for hysteresis or habit formation.  Previous work on 
the determinants of bilateral trade flows using purely cross section data (e.g. 
Eichengreen and Irwin 1996) showed that such habit formation can be important in 
practice. To see whether this holds in the present context, we include the lagged 
dependent variable to a cross section regression estimated 2003 data
45  To correct for 
the bias resulted from adding a lagged dependent variable, we also instrument for the 
lagged dependent variable by the lagged independent variables using two-stage least 
square regressions. The results are shown in Table 12. In all specifications, we find 
that there is a strong evidence for the habit formation.  While most other coefficients 
remain unchanged, the Asia dummy becomes insignificant when we control for bond 
holdings in the previous year. This suggests that whatever is distinctive about cross-
border bond holdings within Asia is persistent over time. 
·  Although central bank reserves are excluded from the CPIS data, it still could be, as 
noted above, that large reserves are signal that exchange rates will be relatively 
                                                 
44 A note on calculation of this measure is available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Readme_ 
kaopen163.pdf 
45 We also add a lagged dependent variable to the panel estimates.  However, this may create 
problems for the consistency of the estimates; hence we prefer to rely on the simple cross section for 
2003.   - 26 - 
 
stable, capital markets will remain open, and liquidity will be ensured through 
backstopping operations. Countries with ample reserves will be more sanguine, 
intuition suggests, about policies of benign neglect toward outward investment.  In 
the inward investment side, some authors (e.g. Dooley and Garber 2005) have argued 
that reserves should be thought of as collateral, that high reserve levels make it easier 
for emerging markets to access foreign financial markets.  We therefore add reserves 
scaled by GDP in the sending and receiving countries to our baseline specification. 
As shown in the first column of Table 13, the coefficient on the reserves of the 
sending country is positive and significant; as expected, countries with ample 
reserves can invest abroad with fewer worries.  However, reserves in the receiving 
country enter negatively, which is inconsistent with the collateral hypothesis.  
·  We explored further possible interpretations of the coefficient on distance.  In Table 
13, we also added to the basic framework measures of incoming and outgoing 
telephone traffic and the cost of telephone calls on the grounds that these tell us 
something about the information flows that are important in portfolio investment 
decisions, and that this may be what the distance variable is picking up.  These 
additional variables also enter with the expected signs (positive and negative, 
respectively) and are strongly significant.  But the distance variable is still negative 
and significant as well. This suggests that distance is picking up something besides 
information communicated through these channels (e.g. time zone difference 
described above).  
·  One possibility is that distance is simply a stand-in for the additional difficulty of 
investing across time zones.  Insofar as claims on countries are traded primarily in   - 27 - 
 
their own time zones, portfolio managers and others may find it inconvenient to get 
up in the middle of the night to check market conditions and transact.  Those 
impressed by the ease of obtaining information on far distant markets in the internet 
age may be inclined toward this alternative interpretation.  We therefore 
experimented with a measure of the number of time zones separating the source and 
destination markets (see Table 13).  When this is substituted for distance in our basic 
specifications, it is again negative and significant (not surprisingly, insofar as 
distance and time zone differences are positively correlated).  But when we include 
both distance and time zone differences, the former is still significantly negative, as 
before, while the latter is not positive and significant.  It would appear, in other 
words that distance is not simply a proxy for time zone differences.  The positive 
coefficient on the latter appears to be capturing a tendency for investors to prefer 
transactions with countries to their east and west rather than to their north or south, 
although why this should be the case remains an open question.
46 
 
6.  Connections with Other Aspects of Financial Development 
  In this section we consider further variables and specifications designed to shed light 
on the impact of other aspects of financial development on bond market integration. 
  We first ask whether stock and bond markets are substitutes or complements.  We 
start by adding the value of listed companies in the source and destination countries as way 
                                                 
46 In particular, this result is not being driven by the inclusion of the major financial centers (the U.S., 
UK and Japan in the sample). The results are largely the same when we exclude the U.S. and Japan 
from the sample (see Table 13).    - 28 - 
 
of capturing the depth of their financial markets.  Both variables enter positively (Table 14), 
but it is the size of stock markets in the source (investing) country that seems to matter.  This 
may indicate that these countries have an active institutional investor community inclined to 
take positions in the securities issued by foreign countries.  We attempt to provide more 
direct evidence on this below.  
We also ask, again following up on our previous work, whether having a large and 
well-developing banking system encourages or discourages efforts to place bonds with 
foreign investors.  For both the source and destination countries, domestic credit provided by 
the banking sector as a share of GDP is positive, suggesting that a large and active banking 
system encourages foreign participation in domestic bond markets.  This is the same thing 
found in our previous study on the size of domestic bond markets.  There we suggested a 
number of reasons why this might be so.  Banks are producers of information about 
conditions in financial markets and about the characteristics of financial instruments that may 
be particularly valuable to foreign investors.  They provide underwriting services for 
domestic issuers, advising the issuer on the terms and timing of the offer.  They provide 
bridge finance in the period when the marketing of bonds is still underway.  They provide 
distribution channels for government bonds and form an important part of the primary dealer 
network.  Their institutional support may also be conducive to secondary-market liquidity.  
Finally and most directly, banks owing to their relatively large size can be major issuers of 
bonds themselves.   
Conversely, there is the fear that an inefficient banking system may hinder bond 
market development and participation and that an imperfectly competitive system, in which 
banks have significant market power, may allow them to use their incumbency advantage to   - 29 - 
 
hinder the advance of securitization and disintermediation.
47  We therefore constructed 
measures of the concentration of the banking system in both the source and destination 
countries (as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of commercial bank assets, using data from 
Bankscope – thus, a higher value indicates greater concentration).  Here measures for both 
the source and destination countries enter negatively as expected, although the signs and 
levels of statistical significance are sensitive to what control variables are included.  We 
similarly added the share of bank assets accounted for by public-sector banks as an additional 
measure of banking sector efficiency.
48 Again, this enters in the expected fashion 
(negatively).  It suggests interpreting this set of results in terms of the negative impact of a 
relatively inefficient banking system of various aspects of bond market development, more 
than in terms of strategic behavior by banks with market power. 
While our other results remain unchanged, the negative coefficient on cross-holdings 
within Latin America now goes to zero even without the addition of measures of the quality 
of institutions.
49  Borensztein, Eichengreen and Panizza (2006b) show that Latin America 
looks better in terms of other dimensions of bond market development when one controls for 
the underdevelopment of the region’s financial system generally.
50  We find the same thing 
                                                 
47 They may do so by limiting access to the payment system and by supporting the maintenance of 
regulations that increase the cost of underwriting and issuance (Schinasi and Smith 1998, Rajan and 
Zingales 2003, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2004). 
48 We compute country-level public bank assets by summing assets of commercial banks with share 
of public ownership more than 50 percent, using the data from Micco, Panizza and Yañez (2004)  
49 Sometimes we even get a significantly positive, albeit small, coefficient. 
50 Another way of putting the point is that the region’s bond markets are underdeveloped for the same 
reasons that the rest of the region’s financial system is underdeveloped (those reasons having to do 
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here.  Note that institutional (and other) factors stunting the development of the banking 
system do not appear to be what is holding back bond market integration in Asia (the 
coefficients on the dummy variable for intra-Asian cross holdings is little different than 
before). 
 
7.  The Composition of the Investor Base 
Another approach to analyzing the importance of institutional factors is to make use 
of the fact that the CPIS reports data by type of institutional investor (banks, insurance 
companies and mutual funds).  East Asia and other regions are making considerable efforts to 
cultivate the participation of institutional investors in their bond markets.  We can use the 
CPIS data to analyze the importance of these agents for cross-border investment both within 
the region and globally. 
In Table 15 we run three parallel regressions for the three categories of holders – 
banks, insurance companies and mutual funds – estimating them by seemingly unrelated 
regression to capitalize on the correlation of disturbance terms across types of holders for 
given country pairs.  These results should be interpreted cautiously, since the sample size is 
now considerably smaller than before.  (There turn out to be a non-negligible number of 
empty cells when we disaggregate by type of investor.)   
For what they are worth, the results show that the basic gravity variables are well 
behaved (virtually without exception the signs remain the same as before).  When we turn to 
                                                                                                                                                       
with the institutional variables that also caused the coefficients for intra-Latin American cross 
holdings to go to zero in Section 4 above).   - 31 - 
 
the dummy variables for intra-regional cross holdings, the comparison of Asia and Europe is 
particularly interesting.  For banks, insurance companies and mutual funds alike, we get large 
positive coefficients for intra-regional positions in bond markets in Europe.  In Asia, 
however, we get a positive coefficient for insurance companies but a strongly negative 
coefficient for mutual funds.  This points to the development and behavior of the mutual fund 
industry as a potential constraint on bond market development in the region.  We want to be 
careful here and to reiterate the provisional nature of these findings, since we have 
information on the foreign asset positions of mutual funds for only a limited number of Asian 
countries.  Still, the results appear to make sense; in a number of Asian countries assets under 
management by insurance companies remain significant larger than those under management 
by mutual funds.  Total assets under management by mutual funds are of roughly the same 
size relative to GDP in East Asia and Latin America (IMF 2005).  Despite the fact that Latin 
American financial markets are relatively underdeveloped along a number of other 
dimensions, regulators there have taken aggressive steps to encourage the participation of 
institutional investors, mutual funds and pension funds in particular.
51  But, in both regions, 
cross-border investment by mutual funds continues to be hindered by a dearth of appropriate 
assets.
52  Note that the Asian Bond Fund, by creating a set of passively managed index funds 
of regional bonds, is designed to address precisely this problem.
53 
                                                 
51 Again, see Borensztein, Eichengreen and Panizza (2006b). 
52 A problem that is compounded by the existence of restrictive covenants that limit the classes of 
assets in which funds can invest. 
53 As noted above, Asian Bond Fund 2 has two components: a $1 billion central bank reserve pool to 
be overseen by professional managers for local bond allocation, and a $1 billion index unit designed 
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8.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  The development of bond markets can be gauged in a number of ways.  In this paper 
we have concentrated on the international dimension.  We used data on the extent to which 
residents of one country hold the bonds of issuers resident in another as a measure of 
financial integration or interrelatedness, asking how Asia compares with Europe and Latin 
America and with the base case in which the purchaser and issuer of the bonds reside in 
different regions.  It is no surprise that Europe is head and shoulders above other regions in 
terms of financial integration so measured.  More interesting is that Asia already seems to 
have made some progress on this front compared to Latin America and the world as a whole.  
The contrast with Latin America is largely explained by stronger creditor and investor rights, 
more expeditious and less costly contract enforcement, and greater transparency that lead to 
larger and better developed financial systems in Asia, something that is conducive to foreign 
participation in local markets and to intra-regional cross holdings of Asian bonds generally.  
Further results based on a limited sample suggest that one factor holding back investment in 
foreign bonds in East Asia may be limited geographical diversification by mutual funds, in 
turn reflecting a dearth of appropriate assets.  Asian Bond Fund 2, by creating a passively 
managed portfolio of local currency bonds potentially attractive to mutual fund managers and 
investors, may help to relax this constraint.   
                                                                                                                                                       
to list on eight stock exchanges beginning with Hong Kong.  The regional index is designed to 
provide a benchmark structure for tracking pan-Asian performance as well as facilitating one-stop 
entry for retail and institutional buyers in particular.   - 33 - 
 
  We also find evidence that cross-holdings are heavily driven by financial conditions 
in the investing country, which suggests that bond market conditions could adjust abruptly 
for reasons having nothing to do with policies in the borrowing economy.  Our results also 
indicate that bondholders are attracted to the securities of countries whose returns co-vary 
with their own, suggesting return chasing rather than diversification behavior.  These are 
reasons for skepticism that the development of bond markets is a panacea for stabilizing 
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Table 1. Average Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings of Long-Term Debt, 2001-2003  









America  Others  Total 
USA & Canada 
                
12,299  
                
51,524  
              
326,252  
                  
6,313  
                
65,230  
              
250,916  
       
712,535  
Asia 
              
444,215  
                
41,920  
              
527,525  
                  
3,124  
                
10,771  
              
254,125  
    
1,281,679  
EU15 
              
624,247  
                
86,538  
           
2,914,030  
                
46,689  
                
51,621  
              
404,261  
    
4,127,386  
Eastern Europe 
                  
2,140  
                         
9  
                  
6,669  
                  
1,033  
                       
46  
                  
1,028  
         
10,926  
Latin America 
                
15,193  
                       
78  
                  
2,225  
                       
22  
                  
6,999  
                  
1,161  
         
25,678  
Others 
              
260,587  
                
19,503  
              
324,228  
                  
3,090  
                
14,189  
                
76,259  
       
697,856  
  Total 
           
1,358,682  
              
199,573  
           
4,100,929  
                
60,271  
              
148,856  
              
987,749  
    
6,856,060  
   Sources: IMF; Authors’ calculation 
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Table 2. Average Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings of Long-Term Debt  










America  Others 
USA & Canada 
                    
0.06     0.64       2.60  
            
2.05  
           
7.97       9.65  
Asia 
                    
2.34     0.52       4.20  
            
1.02  
           
1.32       9.77  
EU15 
       
3.29     1.07     23.18  
          
15.20  
           
6.31     15.54  
Eastern Europe 
                    
0.01     0.00       0.05  
            
0.34  
           
0.01       0.04  
Latin America 
                    
0.08     0.00       0.02  
            
0.01  
           
0.86       0.04  
Others 
                    
1.38     0.24       2.58  
            
1.01  
           
1.73       2.93  
Total 
                    
7.17     2.48     32.62  
          
19.62  
         
18.20     37.98  
Sources: IMF; BIS; Authors’ calculation   - 40 - 
 
 
Table 3. Average Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings of Long-Term Debt,  
by Sector of Holders, 2001-2003  
(In Millions of US Dollars) 
 
        Investment to            
Investment from  USA & 
Canada  Asia  EU15  Eastern 
Europe 
Latin 
America  Others  Total 
  Banks             
129,438.7 
               
5,689.3 
           
122,740.3 
                  
174.7 
                  
632.3 
             




             
79,301.7 
               
1,228.7 
             
62,933.7 
   
12.3 
                  
629.3 
             
35,074.7       179,180.3 
  Mutual Funds               
20,187.7 
                  
297.7 
             
20,691.7 
                  
178.3 
               
1,110.0 
               




             
29,971.7 
               
2,384.0 
             
72,740.3 
               
1,259.3 
               
4,122.0 
             
34,666.3       145,143.7 
  Banks             
160,959.0 
             
51,952.7 
           
792,584.7 
             
19,756.3 
             
17,033.7 
           




           
105,456.3 
               
6,570.7 
           
373,012.0 
               
1,476.7 
                  
902.3 
             
43,001.3       530,419.3 
  Mutual Funds               
40,387.3 
               
4,105.7 
           
211,480.0 
               
1,538.0 
               
4,121.7 
             




             
29,592.0 
                  
981.3 
   
103,420.7 
               
2,243.3 
             
13,031.0 
             
31,213.7       180,482.0 
  Banks                    
293.3 
                      
5.7 
                  
750.3 
                    
50.7 
                    
25.7 
              





                      
0.7 
                        
-   
                      
4.7 
                        
-   
                        
-   
                      
2.7                  8.0 
  Mutual Funds                        
3.3 
                        
-   
                      
5.7 
                      
1.3 
                        
-   
                      




                    
64.3 
         
1.3 
                    
86.0 
                        
-   
                    
15.3 
                    
18.7              185.7 
  Banks                 
4,596.3 
                    
53.0 
                  
996.7 




                  





                  
689.7 
                    
18.3 
                  
277.7 
                      
8.7 
                  
131.0 
                    
51.7           1,177.0 
  Mutual Funds                    
131.3 
                      
0.7 
                    
17.7 
                      
3.0 
                  
218.0 
                      




               
3,568.7 
     
0.3 
                  
114.0 
                        
-   
                  
739.3 
                    
67.0           4,489.3 
  Banks               
19,519.0 
                  
851.0 
             
29,469.7 
                  
592.0 
       
550.0 
               




             
37,889.7 
                  
679.0 
             
22,482.7 
                    
33.7 
                  
196.3 
               
2,512.0         63,793.3 
  Mutual Funds               
15,836.7 
               
1,439.0 
             
13,357.3 
                  
142.3 
                  
886.0 
               




                  
820.0 
                    
11.3 
             
1,634.3 
                    
15.0 
                    
24.0 
                  
230.3           2,735.0 
       Source: IMF; Authors’ calculation.   - 41 - 
 
Table 4. Baseline Results: Pooled OLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
log of GDP-source country  0.405  0.419      0.307 
  (38.71)**  (36.48)**      (27.43)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.636  0.654      0.524 
  (85.38)**  (80.27)**      (58.72)** 
log of GDP, PPP-source country      0.384     
      (28.15)**     
log of GDP, PPP-destination country      0.666     
      (67.91)**     
log of GDP per capita-source country        0.900  0.764 
        (34.36)**  (32.18)** 
log of GDP per capita-destination country        0.902  0.445 
        (60.27)**  (29.22)** 
log of Distance  -0.579  -0.545  -0.470  -0.244  -0.456 
  (24.47)**  (21.24)**  (16.90)**  (8.99)**  (19.16)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.133  0.198  0.266  1.277  0.535 
  (1.22)  (1.74)  (2.18)*  (10.45)**  (5.07)** 
Common Language Dummy  0.415  0.335  0.445  0.151  0.259 
  (8.46)**  (6.36)**  (7.74)**  (2.65)**  (5.32)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.359  -0.411  -0.654  -0.009  0.012 
  (9.99)**  (10.41)**  (15.21)**  (0.21)  (8.92)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.806  -0.816  -1.079  -0.080  0.002 
  (20.15)**  (18.56)**  (22.42)**  (1.48)  (1.51) 
LIBOR - Source Country Interest Rate    0.020  0.021  0.012  -0.122 
    (14.38)**  (13.77)**  (7.93)**  (3.19)** 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR    -0.010  -0.018  -0.000  -0.149 
    (6.85)**  (11.09)**  (0.04)  (3.21)** 
Asia  0.860  0.643  0.803  2.305  1.112 
  (5.72)**  (4.24)**  (4.95)**  (14.19)**  (7.92)** 
EU15  3.808  3.516  3.940  3.683  3.056 
  (43.57)**  (39.34)**  (41.43)**  (38.20)**  (36.69)** 
Latin America  -0.279  0.199  0.306  0.187  0.407 
  (2.83)**  (1.80)  (2.55)*  (1.57)  (3.98)** 
Constant  -19.034  -19.694  -20.157  -11.876  -25.709 
  (50.56)**  (48.57)**  (41.38)**  (31.79)**  (63.07)** 
Observations  12,481  10,654  10,180  10,654  10654 
R-squared  0.58  0.61  0.57  0.55  0.67 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           











Table 5. Baseline Results: Destination Country Fixed and Random Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE 
log of GDP-source country  0.428  0.430  0.439  0.440          0.317  0.318 
  (45.63)**  (45.91)**  (42.10)**  (42.25)**          (30.49)**  (30.65)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.585  0.814  0.620  0.809          0.489  -0.068 
  (23.45)**  (2.04)*  (22.44)**  (1.75)          (18.72)**  (0.05) 
log of GDP, PPP-source country          0.425  0.429         
          (35.36)**  (35.80)**         
log of GDP, PPP-destination country          0.633  0.459         
          (20.56)**  (0.97)         
log of GDP per capita-source country              1.006  1.014  0.794  0.797 
              (46.06)**  (46.87)**  (36.17)**  (36.36)** 
log of GDP per capita-destination country              0.838  1.328  0.423  1.068 
              (19.81)**  (2.53)*  (9.89)**  (0.65) 
log of Distance  -0.714  -0.730  -0.657  -0.669  -0.575  -0.586  -0.373  -0.377  -0.566  -0.584 
    (27.65)**  (27.84)**  (22.87)**  (22.87)**  (19.09)**  (19.15)**  (13.47)**  (13.45)**  (20.98)**  (21.09)** 
Land Border Dummy  -0.098  -0.121  0.011  -0.006  0.078  0.060  0.764  0.733  0.349  0.323 
  (0.98)  (1.22)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.71)  (0.55)  (7.34)**  (7.10)**  (3.50)**  (3.23)** 
Common Language Dummy  0.353  0.348  0.323  0.322  0.403  0.396  0.301  0.323  0.278  0.284 
  (7.50)**  (7.38)**  (6.33)**    (6.27)**  (7.43)**  (7.31)**  (5.94)**  (6.39)**  (5.78)**  (5.87)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.178  -0.105  -0.259  -0.183  -0.351  -0.132  -0.129  -0.143  -0.144  -0.167 
  (2.20)*  (1.01)  (2.83)**  (1.55)  (3.59)**  (0.98)  (1.43)  (1.22)  (1.78)  (1.48) 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.874  -0.877  -0.870  -0.872  -1.219  -1.230  -0.143  -0.149  -0.147  -0.147 
  (24.17)**  (24.25)**  (21.71)**  (21.75)**  (28.51)**  (28.84)**  (3.17)**  (3.34)**  (3.44)**  (3.45)** 
LIBOR - Source Country Interest Rate      0.018  0.018  0.019  0.019  0.012  0.012  0.009  0.009 
      (14.28)**  (14.17)**  (14.49)**  (14.51)**  (9.03)**  (9.14)**  (7.59)**  (7.33)** 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR      -0.005  -0.001  -0.010  -0.002  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
      (1.59)  (0.11)  (2.91)**  (0.37)  (0.20)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
Asia  0.932  0.911  0.897  0.893  1.049  1.048  1.910  1.864  1.358  1.351 
  (6.32)**  (6.16)**  (5.95)**  (5.89)**  (6.69)**  (6.66)**  (12.82)**  (12.54)**  (9.54)**  (9.42)** 
EU15  3.183  3.121  3.058  3.010  3.259  3.181  3.115  3.061  2.790  2.746 
  (36.04)**  (35.16)**  (33.49)**  (32.76)**  (34.35)**  (33.41)**  (34.52)**  (33.99)**  (32.37)**  (31.59)** 
Latin America  -0.576  -0.611  -0.103  -0.132  -0.025  -0.055  0.162  0.159  0.251  0.221 
  (5.85)**  (6.16)**  (0.93)  (1.18)  (0.22)  (0.47)  (1.47)  (1.44)  (2.39)*  (2.08)* 
Constant  -17.393  -22.747  -18.636  -23.137  -19.825  -15.512  -11.431  -15.261  -24.345  -16.008 
  (25.91)**  (2.37)*  (24.84)**  (2.07)*  (23.02)**  (1.31)  (23.55)**  (3.54)**  (38.15)**  (0.72) 
Observations  12,481  12,481  10,654  10,654  10,180  10,180  10,654  10,654  10,654  10,654 
Number of group (destination countries)  156  156  133  133  129  129  133  133  133  133 
R2-overall  0.58  0.57  0.61  0.60  0.56  0.53  0.54  0.53  0.67  0.53 
R2-within  0.40  0.40  0.43  0.43  0.41  0.41  0.44  0.44  0.49  0.49 
R2-between  0.74  0.74  0.79  0.78  0.70  0.69  0.62  0.62  0.86  0.53 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects   25,192.19    17,716.94    25,205.25    57,638.89    13,214.07   
  Prob > Chi2   0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00   
Hausman  Specification Test     49.36    22.97    123.60    48.81    69.50 
  Prob > Chi2     0.00    0.03    0.00    0.00    0.00 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 





Table 6. Baseline Results: Country Pair Random Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
log of GDP-source country  0.407  0.438      0.301 
  (26.44)**  (26.18)**      (18.10)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.605  0.622      0.493 
  (55.29)**  (52.30)**      (37.61)** 
log of GDP, PPP-source country      0.378     
      (19.44)**     
log of GDP, PPP-destination country      0.623     
      (43.64)**     
log of GDP per capita-source country        0.878  0.745 
        (25.92)**  (23.31)** 
log of GDP per capita-destination country        0.826  0.419 
        (41.21)**  (19.99)** 
log of Distance  -0.579  -0.604  -0.558  -0.292  -0.479 
  (16.58)**  (16.09)**  (13.84)**  (7.38)**  (13.79)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.007  -0.037  -0.021  1.152  0.408 
  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (6.17)**  (2.51)* 
Common Language Dummy  0.467  0.434  0.561  0.180  0.288 
  (6.44)**  (5.60)**  (6.64)**  (2.17)*  (4.03)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.190  -0.264  -0.336  -0.106  -0.141 
  (5.66)**  (7.00)**  (8.14)**  (2.71)**  (3.80)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.488  -0.518  -0.574  -0.197  -0.225 
  (12.43)**  (12.12)**  (12.94)**  (4.26)**  (5.18)** 
LIBOR – Source Country Interest Rate    0.005  0.005  0.002  0.002 
    (5.32)**  (5.33)**  (1.76)  (2.41)* 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR    -0.006  -0.009  -0.001  0.000 
    (3.86)**  (5.87)**  (0.68)  (0.09) 
Asia  0.769  0.581  0.655  2.442  1.213 
  (3.27)**  (2.45)*  (2.57)*  (9.66)**  (5.52)** 
EU15  4.131  3.846  4.362  3.895  3.254 
  (29.60)**  (26.88)**  (28.68)**  (25.39)**  (24.47)** 
Latin America  -0.159  -0.046  -0.077  0.043  0.313 
  (1.10)  (0.30)  (0.46)  (0.26)  (2.21)* 
Constant  -18.611  -19.376  -18.803  -10.790  -24.340 
  (33.15)**  (31.99)**  (26.58)**  (20.89)**  (41.30)** 
Observations  12,481  10,654  10,180  10,654  10,654 
Number of group (country pair)  5,166  4,436  4,342  4,436  4,436 
R2-overall  0.58  0.61  0.55  0.55  0.67 
R2-within  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
R2-between  0.57  0.60  0.54  0.54  0.66 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects  8,971.53  7,422.27  7,226.88  8,132.88  7,092.55 
  Prob > Chi2   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             - 44 - 
 
Table 7. Historical Total Bond Returns vs Interest Rates 










log of GDP-source country  0.961  1.013  0.976  1.038 
  (50.33)**  (31.05)**  (45.90)**  (29.56)** 
log of GDP-destination country  2.520  0.864  1.996  0.887 
  (2.98)**  (28.28)**  (2.17)*  (26.15)** 
log of Distance  -0.580  -0.560  -0.593  -0.611 
  (12.30)**  (8.75)**  (11.53)**  (8.90)** 
Land Border Dummy  -0.146  -0.114  -0.188  -0.237 
  (1.00)  (0.47)  (1.22)  (0.93) 
Common Language Dummy  0.804  0.864  0.805  0.927 
  (9.60)**  (6.69)**  (9.12)**  (6.83)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.184  -0.262  -0.060  -0.297 
  (0.79)  (3.62)**  (0.20)  (3.58)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -1.624  -1.129  -1.589  -1.107 
  (25.88)**  (15.06)**  (23.97)**  (14.04)** 
Historical Bond Returns-source country  -0.094  -0.013     
  (4.56)**  (1.18)     
Historical Bond Returns-destination country  0.043  0.016     
  (2.25)*  (1.77)     
LIBOR – Source Country Interest Rate      0.006  -0.002 
      (2.69)**  (0.98) 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR      0.007  0.003 
      (1.07)  (1.17) 
Correlation of Bond Returns  1.598  0.979  1.804  1.154 
  (11.70)**  (7.73)**  (12.19)**  (8.38)** 
Volatility of  Bilateral Exchange Rates  -0.101  -0.027  -0.054  -0.020 
  (5.74)**  (2.90)**  (3.17)**  (2.09)* 
Asia  1.416  0.817  1.391  0.710 
  (7.88)**  (2.93)**  (7.58)**  (2.51)* 
EU15  1.736  2.645  1.642  2.450 
  (11.88)**  (13.19)**  (10.63)**  (11.71)** 
Latin America  -0.930  -0.661  -0.964  -0.897 
  (4.90)**  (2.46)*  (4.48)**  (3.04)** 
Constant  -82.063  -41.079  -69.033  -41.933 
  (3.74)**  (32.67)**  (2.88)**  (30.95)** 
Observations  4,072  4,072  3,682  3,682 
Number of Groups  52  1,615  47  1,461 
R2-overall  0.52  0.67  0.58  0.67 
R2-within  0.65  0.04  0.65  0.04 
R2-between  0.67  0.69  0.68  0.69 
Hausman Specification Test  41.36    29.79   
  Prob > Chi2  0.00    0.00   
Breusch-Pagan  LM Test for Random Effects    2,592.41    2,309.43 
  Prob > Chi2     0.00    0.00 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
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Table 8. Development of Financial Sector 










log of GDP-source country  0.303  0.366  0.387  0.454 
  (29.59)**  (23.36)**  (28.32)**  (22.00)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.530  0.547  0.676  0.653 
  (20.32)**  (45.33)**  (15.24)**  (33.87)** 
log of Distance  -0.705  -0.590  -0.857  -0.740 
  (28.00)**  (17.49)**  (27.92)**  (18.24)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.107  0.115  0.027  0.048 
  (1.10)  (0.71)  (0.25)  (0.27) 
Common Language Dummy  0.286  0.364  0.331  0.369 
  (6.24)**  (5.19)**  (5.17)**  (3.86)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.166  -0.174  -0.189  -0.231 
  (2.16)*  (5.18)**  (1.80)  (4.85)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.657  -0.474  -0.938  -0.705 
  (18.10)**  (12.01)**  (19.98)**  (13.36)** 
Size of Banking Sector-source country  0.009  0.003  0.011  0.005 
  (29.14)**  (11.13)**  (24.99)**  (11.29)** 
Size of Banking Sector-destination country  0.006  0.005  0.003  0.003 
  (5.87)**  (11.03)**  (2.60)**  (5.44)** 
Size of Stock Market-source country      0.008  0.005 
      (20.75)**  (11.87)** 
Size of Stock Market-destination country      0.001  0.001 
      (1.23)  (3.23)** 
Asia  0.716  0.541  0.160  0.036 
  (4.99)**  (2.39)*  (1.02)  (0.15) 
EU15  3.110  3.917  2.606  3.357 
  (36.17)**  (29.0)**  (27.65)**  (22.8)** 
Latin America  -0.269  0.036  -0.479  -0.080 
  (2.80)**  (0.26)  (3.35)**  (0.42) 
Constant  -14.351  -16.744  -19.318  -20.752 
  (21.35)**  (29.96)**  (17.23)**  (27.75)** 
Observations  12,214  12,214  7,961  7,961 
Number of Groups  153  5088  96  3499 
R2-overall  0.62  0.61  0.63  0.62 
R2-within  0.44  0.01  0.56  0.01 
R2-between  0.80  0.60  0.78  0.63 
Breusch-Pagan  LM Test for Random Effects  20,862.50  8,336.51  13,797.59  4,952.58 
  Prob > Chi2   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Number of group(pair)         
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
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Table 9. Quality of Institutions: Destination Country Random Effects 
(usual gravity model variables not reported) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
log of GDP per capita-source country    0.872       
    (27.37)**       
log of GDP per capita-destination country    0.447       
    (11.37)**       
Law and order risk  0.224  0.163    0.195   
  (11.21)**  (8.37)**    (6.59)**   
Corruption risk  -0.045  -0.214    0.021   
  (2.13)*  (9.92)**    (0.68)   
Bureaucratic quality  0.237  -0.133    0.319   
  (7.71)**  (4.05)**    (7.09)**   
Investment profile  0.148  0.095    0.307   
  (10.36)**  (6.85)**    (15.47)**   
LIBOR – Source Country Interest Rate      0.025  0.007   
      (15.50)**  (4.25)**   
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR      0.011  0.009   
      (2.34)*  (1.97)*   
Sovereign Credit Ratings (S&P)      0.093  0.109   
      (5.49)**  (6.56)**   
English legal origin          -0.418 
          (1.17) 
French legal origin          -0.155 
          (0.44) 
German legal origin          -0.208 
          (0.55) 
Socialist legal origin          -0.516 
          (1.28) 
Creditor Rights          -0.020 
          (0.33) 
Contract Enforcement Days          -0.001 
          (2.09)* 
Asia   1.405  1.532  0.811  1.533  0.920 
  (9.82)**  (11.06)**  (4.78)**  (9.52)**  (5.96)** 
EU15   3.069  2.917  2.598  2.386  3.164 
  (35.97)**  (35.28)**  (24.31)**  (23.72)**  (33.14)** 
Latin America  0.403  0.299  0.180  1.159  -0.697 
  (3.95)**  (3.02)**  (1.31)  (8.59)**  (6.04)** 
Constant  -22.425  -24.410  -22.685  -30.615  -21.381 
  (33.81)**  (39.90)**  (21.77)**  (28.89)**  (23.13)** 
Observations  12,343  12,343  7,159  7,048  10,420 
Number of IFS Country Code 1  156  156  75  75  121 
R2-overall  0.60  0.65  0.60  0.64  0.60 
R2-within  0.44  0.47  0.49  0.56  0.42 
R2-between  0.75  0.83  0.82  0.81  0.81 
Breusch-Pagan  LM Test for Random Effects  3,0081.25  19,210.76  5,777.85  8,106.69  13,159.93 
  Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Robust t statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 10. Heckman Selectivity Bias Correction 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
log of GDP-source country  0.152  0.232  0.704 
  (10.39)**  (18.48)**  (21.65)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.637  0.637  0.906 
  (87.98)**  (87.81)**  (41.79)** 
log of Distance  -0.540  -0.546  -0.659 
  (23.57)**  (23.72)**  (14.59)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.275  0.381  -0.046 
  (2.61)**  (3.63)**  (0.29) 
Common Language Dummy  0.401  0.326  0.615 
  (8.33)**  (6.67)**  (7.10)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.380  -0.385  -0.526 
  (10.80)**  (10.95)**  (7.68)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.430  -0.458  -0.825 
  (10.46)**  (11.17)**  (10.79)** 
LIBOR – Source Country Interest Rate      0.026 
      (7.61)** 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR      0.011 
      (4.15)** 
Correlation of Bond Returns      1.547 
      (10.47)** 
Volatility of  Bilateral Exchange Rates      -0.069 
      (4.13)** 
Asia  0.968  0.874  0.354 
  (6.68)**  (6.04)**  (2.07)* 
EU15  3.607  3.551  1.448 
  (41.34)**  (40.87)**  (9.53)** 
Latin America  -0.035  -0.155  -0.275 
  (0.38)  (1.53)  (1.33) 
Constant  -12.308  -14.431  -32.144 
  (26.44)**  (34.39)**  (28.66)** 
       
Selection Equation       
log of GDP-source country  0.404  0.267  0.367 
  (80.29)**  (39.67)**  (34.14)** 
log of GDP per capita-source country  0.764  0.718  0.673 
  (94.78)**  (66.70)**  (46.07)** 
Market Capitalization    0.003  0.007 
    (9.97)**  (13.63)** 
Domestic Bank Credit     0.008  0.005 
    (29.70)**  (11.58)** 
Constant  -16.967  -13.715  -16.363 
  (124.07)**  (72.32)**  (55.30)** 
Observations  93,791  35,435  26,902 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         - 48 - 
 
Table 11. Sensitivity Checks: Destination Country Random Effects 
(usual gravity model variables not reported) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Historical Bond Returns-source country  -0.091  -0.095  0.062  -0.189  -0.152 
  (4.42)**  (4.57)**  (3.03)**  (8.26)**  (7.43)** 
Historical Bond Returns-destination country  0.035  -0.034  -0.005  -0.096  -0.041 
  (1.90)  (2.46)*  (0.37)  (6.30)**  (2.94)** 
Correlation of Bond Returns  1.588  1.713  1.511  1.348  1.782 
  (11.62)**  (12.64)**  (11.81)**  (9.01)**  (13.15)** 
Volatility of  Bilateral Exchange Rates  -0.100         
  (5.82)**         
Pegged Exchange Rate Regime (Reinhart-Rogoff)    0.197  0.206  0.033  0.210 
    (1.06)  (1.13)  (0.17)  (1.12) 
Limited Flexibility (Reinhart-Rogoff)    -0.259  -0.195  -0.385  -0.235 
    (1.66)  (1.31)  (2.27)*  (1.49) 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.340  -0.159       
  (2.14)*  (0.97)       
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -1.618  -1.639       
  (25.72)**  (25.98)**       
NB_capital openness—inflow       0.092     
      (2.26)*     
NB_capital openness—outflow       -0.085     
      (2.14)*     
NB_financial openness index-destination country      0.340     
      (20.71)**     
Chinn-Ito Capital Control-destination country        0.158   
        (2.74)**   
share of last 5 years with capital controls on bond inflow          -0.320 
          (1.53) 
share of last 5 years with capital controls on bond outflow          -1.999 
          (26.42)** 
Dummy for IMF program-destination country  0.105  0.064  0.111  0.187  0.055 
  (0.60)  (0.36)  (0.65)  (0.91)  (0.31) 
Asia  1.380  1.434  1.800  0.853  1.594 
  (7.74)**  (8.03)**  (10.55)**  (4.40)**  (8.90)** 
EU15  1.769  1.817  1.557  2.348  1.479 
  (12.15)**  (12.46)**  (11.19)**  (14.55)**  (10.01)** 
Latin America  -0.845  -0.956  -0.927  -1.271  -0.743 
  (4.50)**  (5.09)**  (5.17)**  (6.21)**  (3.94)** 
Constant  -39.256  -38.902  -42.633  -38.632  -35.946 
  (20.43)**  (19.23)**  (21.54)**  (18.43)**  (17.33)** 
Observations  4072  4072  4072  3876  4072 
Number of IFS Country Code 1  52  52  52  49  52 
R2-overall  0.67  0.68  0.70  0.64  0.68 
R2-within  0.65  0.65  0.69  0.59  0.65 
R2-between  0.71  0.73  0.73  0.77  0.73 
Breusch-Pagan  LM Test for Random Effects  4,886.47  4,275.74  5,183.11  2,315.52  4,485.49 
  Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 12. Sensitivity Checks: Lagged Dependent Variable  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS  RE  IV  OLS  IV 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.942  0.931  1.061  0.899  0.975 
  (130.96)**  (126.05)**  (24.06)**  (71.26)**  (24.04)** 
log of GDP-source country  -0.005  0.001  -0.056  0.066  0.001 
  (0.49)  (0.07)  (2.63)**  (3.22)**  (0.03) 
log of GDP-destination country  0.078  0.086  -0.003  0.119  0.053 
  (9.95)**  (9.57)**  (0.09)  (6.01)**  (1.33) 
Log of Distance  -0.121  -0.126  -0.063  -0.218  -0.194 
  (6.12)**  (5.98)**  (2.12)*  (5.99)**  (5.01)** 
Land Border Dummy  -0.171  -0.168  -0.222  -0.380  -0.407 
  (2.07)*  (2.05)*  (2.51)*  (3.00)**  (3.15)** 
1 for Common Language  -0.044  -0.027  -0.082  -0.017  -0.064 
  (1.12)  (0.69)  (1.90)  (0.25)  (0.88) 
LIBOR - Source Country Interest Rate  0.011  0.012  0.005     
  (4.90)**  (5.21)**  (1.52)     
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR  -0.001  -0.002  0.001     
  (0.97)  (1.11)  (0.64)     
control on bond or other debt instruments (inflow)  -0.036  -0.042  0.022  0.006  0.032 
  (1.19)  (1.14)  (0.58)  (0.10)  (0.55) 
control on bond or other debt instruments (outflow)  -0.122  -0.129  -0.038  -0.270  -0.150 
  (3.13)**  (3.37)**  (0.76)  (4.35)**  (1.71) 
Historical Bond Returns-source country        -0.083  -0.055 
        (2.78)**  (1.64) 
Historical Bond Returns-destination country        0.066  0.054 
        (3.55)**  (2.71)** 
Correlation of Bond Returns        0.236  0.170 
        (2.01)*  (1.37) 
Volatility of  Bilateral Exchange Rates        -0.019  -0.008 
        (1.02)  (0.40) 
Asia  -0.133  -0.099  -0.198  -0.206  -0.261 
  (1.24)  (0.90)  (1.73)  (1.50)  (1.83) 
EU15  0.149  0.158  -0.249  -0.012  -0.188 
  (2.22)*  (2.27)*  (1.54)  (0.09)  (1.21) 
Latin America  0.158  0.106  0.173  0.002  -0.021 
  (1.72)  (1.13)  (1.80)  (0.01)  (0.13) 
Constant  -0.313  -0.578  2.152  -2.296  0.642 
  (0.92)  (1.61)  (2.21)*  (2.76)**  (0.38) 
Observations  3014  3014  3014  1241  1241 
R-squared  0.95    0.94  0.94  0.94 
Number of Destination countries    129       
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 13. Sensitivity Check: Reserves, Distance, Time Zone, and Information costs 
 













log of GDP-source country  0.473  0.385  0.416  0.336  0.669 
  (21.41)**  (33.25)**  (36.39)**  (27.80)**  (36.15)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.663  0.653  0.647  0.624  0.577 
  (44.35)**  (78.30)**  (79.24)**  (76.00)**  (15.92)** 
Log of Distance  -0.629    -0.778  -0.779  -0.537 
  (13.50)**    (21.55)**  (21.88)**  (12.41)** 
Time Zone Difference    -0.050  0.075  0.082   
    (8.40)**  (9.13)**  (9.89)**   
phone traffic          0.000 
          (9.75)** 
phone cost          -0.548 
          (11.24)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.123  0.955  0.019  -0.010  -0.004 
  (0.62)  (8.76)**  (0.17)  (0.09)  (0.02) 
1 for Common Language  0.259  0.241  0.343  0.274  0.647 
  (2.73)**  (4.52)**  (6.54)**  (5.19)**  (7.04)** 
LIBOR - Source Country Interest Rate  0.047  0.024  0.020  0.019  0.034 
  (10.80)**  (16.82)**  (13.97)**  (13.99)**  (15.73)** 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR  -0.017  -0.014  -0.008  -0.007  0.014 
  (5.65)**  (9.60)**  (5.28)**  (4.90)**  (4.48)** 
control on bond or other debt instruments (inflow)  -0.433  -0.453  -0.406  -0.417  -0.121 
  (6.11)**  (11.28)**  (10.31)**  (10.71)**  (1.37) 
control on bond or other debt instruments (outflow)  -0.946  -0.914  -0.807  -0.760  -1.505 
  (10.09)**  (20.55)**  (18.41)**  (17.70)**  (21.38)** 
Reserves/GDP - source country  2.186         
  (8.36)**         
Reserves/GDP - destination country  -0.785         
  (3.56)**         
Asia  -0.044  0.937  0.745  1.137  0.845 
  (0.16)  (6.07)**  (4.92)**  (7.31)**  (4.27)** 
EU15  3.555  4.047  3.492  3.653  2.867 
  (22.29)**  (46.47)**  (39.21)**  (41.94)**  (25.18)** 
Latin America  0.101  0.463  0.257  0.225  0.472 
  (0.51)  (4.13)**  (2.34)*  (2.09)*  (2.21)* 
Constant  -20.389  -22.934  -17.898  -15.358  -23.678 
  (27.10)**  (58.51)**  (39.84)**  (33.35)**  (22.57)** 
Observations  3387  10654  10654  10220  4501 
R-squared  0.64  0.60  0.62  0.62  0.61 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           
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Table 14. Financial Development: Recipient Country Random Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
log of GDP-source country  0.317  0.336  0.326  0.418 
  (28.42)**  (19.75)**  (28.13)**  (28.51)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.560  0.648  0.605  0.726 
  (20.24)**  (17.96)**  (21.28)**  (16.13)** 
log of Distance  -0.673  -0.664  -0.664  -0.834 
  (24.14)**  (20.25)**  (23.36)**  (24.91)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.175  0.228  0.178  0.074 
  (1.71)  (2.04)*  (1.72)  (0.64) 
Common Language Dummy  0.271  0.431  0.288  0.273 
  (5.46)**  (6.39)**  (5.62)**  (4.09)** 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.239  -0.241  -0.249  -0.306 
  (2.77)**  (2.28)*  (2.90)**  (2.67)** 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -0.683  -0.840  -0.724  -0.876 
  (17.20)**  (15.66)**  (17.75)**  (16.89)** 
LIBOR – Source Country Interest Rate  0.012  0.015  0.008  0.019 
  (9.48)**  (9.94)**  (6.10)**  (7.53)** 
Destination Country Interest Rate - LIBOR  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.003 
  (1.53)  (0.96)  (1.51)  (0.43) 
Size of Banking Sector-source country  0.009  0.012  0.009  0.010 
  (26.04)**  (24.73)**  (23.40)**  (21.17)** 
Size of Banking Sector-destination country  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.003 
  (4.78)**  (4.32)**  (4.69)**  (2.07)* 
Bank Concentration Index-source country    -0.325     
    (2.31)*     
Bank Concentration Index-destination country    -0.224     
    (0.80)     
Share of public bank assets-source country      -0.013   
      (9.28)**   
Share of public bank assets-destination country      -0.007   
      (3.65)**   
Size of Stock Market-source country        0.008 
        (19.41)** 
Size of Stock Market-destination country        0.001 
        (0.59) 
Asia  0.692  0.539  0.736  0.121 
  (4.73)**  (3.37)**  (4.98)**  (0.77) 
EU15  3.015  2.752  2.932  2.513 
  (33.99)**  (28.35)**  (32.70)**  (26.20)** 
Latin America  0.042  0.275  0.160  -0.201 
  (0.39)  (2.29)*  (1.46)  (1.25) 
Constant  -15.371  -18.222  -16.542  -21.137 
  (21.24)**  (17.70)**  (22.11)**  (18.21)** 
Observations  10557  7553  10102  7038 
Number of Destination Country  132  89  124  85 
R2-overall  0.64  0.65  0.65  0.65 
R2-within  0.46  0.51  0.47  0.57 
R2-between  0.82  0.84  0.85  0.82 
Breusch-Pagan  LM Test for Random Effects  16397.08  9351.59  11799.28  10667.40 
Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 

















Table 15. Investor Base Equations 
  Destination RE  Destination FE  SUR 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Banks  Insurance 
Mutual 
Funds  Banks  Insurance 
Mutual 
Funds  Banks  Insurance 
Mutual 
Funds 
log of GDP-source country  0.927  0.692  0.857  0.927  0.703  0.847  0.927  0.681  0.881 
  (36.38)**  (25.08)**  (28.04)**  (36.26)**  (25.40)**  (27.50)**  (26.30)**  (21.68)**  (26.70)** 
log of GDP-destination country  0.666  0.648  0.530  0.077  0.332  -1.825  0.739  0.734  0.564 
  (10.82)**  (11.62)**  (10.10)**  (0.07)  (0.29)  (1.33)  (21.80)**  (24.28)**  (17.79)** 
log of Distance  -0.391  0.094  -0.308  -0.382  0.139  -0.346  -0.246  -0.072  -0.266 
  (6.35)**  (1.37)  (4.06)**  (5.87)**  (1.91)  (4.14)**  (3.17)**  (1.04)  (3.66)** 
Land Border Dummy  0.441  0.346  0.110  0.442  0.416  0.076  0.349  0.114  0.168 
  (2.47)*  (1.77)  (0.47)  (2.46)*  (2.12)*  (0.32)  (1.28)  (0.47)  (0.65) 
Common Language Dummy  0.644  0.503  0.061  0.662  0.502  0.030  0.538  0.375  0.075 
  (5.50)**  (4.35)**  (0.44)  (5.60)**  (4.29)**  (0.22)  (3.45)**  (2.69)**  (0.51) 
Control on bond transactions (inflow)  -0.241  -0.403  -0.192  -0.182  0.044  0.152  -0.359  -0.570  -0.258 
  (1.46)  (2.60)**  (1.25)  (0.62)  (0.14)  (0.43)  (3.29)**  (5.86)**  (2.53)* 
Control on bond transactions (outflow)  -1.380  -1.409  -1.073  -1.389  -1.457  -1.073  -1.198  -1.257  -1.140 
  (16.75)**  (17.32)**  (10.11)**  (16.72)**  (17.75)**  (9.90)**  (9.50)**  (11.17)**  (9.65)** 
Bond Returns-source country  0.044  0.041  0.048  0.046  0.045  0.049  0.061  0.047  0.056 
  (2.03)*  (2.16)*  (2.03)*  (2.07)*  (2.33)*  (2.08)*  (2.28)*  (1.97)*  (2.24)* 
Bond Returns-destination country  0.043  0.047  0.054  0.047  0.034  0.056  0.075  0.097  0.055 
  (1.95)  (2.20)*  (2.15)*  (2.01)*  (1.47)  (1.99)*  (2.88)**  (4.17)**  (2.23)* 
Correlation of Bond Returns  1.067  2.302  0.659  1.063  2.410  0.688  0.323  1.918  0.562 
  (5.49)**  (10.98)**  (2.70)**  (5.41)**  (11.33)**  (2.74)**  (1.15)  (7.66)**  (2.14)* 
Volatility of  Bilateral Exchange Rates  -0.039  -0.016  -0.067  -0.043  -0.002  -0.067  -0.080  -0.077  -0.070 
  (1.99)*  (0.83)  (2.73)**  (2.08)*  (0.12)  (2.49)*  (3.20)**  (3.47)**  (2.99)** 
Asia  0.330  0.652  -1.075  0.396  0.841  -1.014  0.064  0.265  -1.334 
  (1.32)  (2.36)*  (3.24)**  (1.55)  (2.99)**  (2.96)**  (0.18)  (0.84)  (4.01)** 
EU15  2.244  2.676  1.739  2.272  2.578  1.771  2.802  2.697  1.705 
  (10.76)**  (11.61)**  (7.08)**  (10.54)**  (10.74)**  (6.67)**  (10.59)**  (11.42)**  (6.88)** 
Latin America  -0.588  0.390  -0.207  -0.614  0.540  -0.428  0.131  0.162  0.062 
  (2.56)*  (1.74)  (0.84)  (2.59)**  (2.30)*  (1.62)  (0.49)  (0.67)  (0.24) 
Constant  -35.908  -33.980  -31.487  -20.726  -26.616  29.997  -39.148  -34.300  -33.245 
  (19.81)**  (19.26)**  (18.12)**  (0.74)  (0.91)  (0.84)  (26.21)**  (25.74)**  (23.78)** 
Observations  2,517  1,749  1,509  2,517  1,749  1,509  1,351  1,351  1,351 
Number of Destination Country  52  52  52  52  52  52       
R-squared  0.81  0.83  0.73  0.62  0.65  0.58  0.68  0.72  0.63 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 





Appendix I: List of Participants in CPIS 
  2001  2002  2003      2001  2002  2003 
Argentina  1  1  1    Malta  1  1  1 
Aruba  1  1  1    Mauritius  1  1  1 
Australia  1  1  1    Mexico  0  0  1 
Austria  1  1  1    Netherlands  1  1  1 
Bahamas, The  1  1  1    Netherlands Antilles  1  1  1 
Bahrain  1  0  0    New Zealand  1  1  1 
Barbados  0  0  1    Norway  1  1  1 
Belgium  1  1  1    Pakistan  0  1  1 
Bermuda  1  1  1    Panama  1  1  1 
Brazil  1  1  1    Philippines  1  1  1 
Bulgaria  1  1  1    Poland  1  1  1 
Canada  1  1  1    Portugal  1  1  1 
Cayman Islands  1  1  1    Romania  1  1  1 
Chile  1  1  1    Russian Federation  1  1  1 
Colombia  1  1  1    Singapore  1  1  1 
Costa Rica  1  1  1    Slovak Republic  1  1  1 
Cyprus  1  1  1    South Africa  1  1  1 
Czech Republic  1  1  1    Spain  1  1  1 
Denmark  1  1  1    Sweden  1  1  1 
Egypt  1  1  1    Switzerland  1  1  1 
Estonia  1  1  1    Thailand  1  1  1 
Finland  1  1  1    Turkey  1  1  1 
France  1  1  1    Ukraine  1  1  1 
Germany  1  1  1    United Kingdom  1  1  1 
Greece  1  1  1    United States  1  1  1 
Guernsey  1  1  1    Uruguay  1  1  1 
Hong Kong SAR of China  1  1  1    Vanuatu  1  1  1 
Hungary  1  1  1    Venezuela  1  1  1 
Iceland  1  1  1           
Indonesia  1  1  1      Total  67  67  69 
Ireland  1  1  1           
Isle of Man  1  1  1           
Israel  1  1  1           
Italy  1  1  1           
Japan  1  1  1           
Jersey  1  1  1           
Kazakhstan  1  1  1           
Korea, Republic of  1  1  1           
Lebanon  1  1  1           
Luxembourg  1  1  1           
Macao SAR of China  1  1  1           
Malaysia  1  1  1             - 54 - 
 
Appendix II. Data Description 
Variable  Description  Source 
GDP  GDP at current US$  World Bank' s WDI 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita at current US$  World Bank' s WDI 
GDP, PPP  GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity  World Bank' s WDI 
Distance  Distance between countries (in logs)  Andrew Rose' s website 
Land border dummy  Dummy variable=1 if the two countries share a land 
border 
Andrew Rose' s website 
Common language 
dummy 
Dummy variable=1 if the two countries have a 
common language 
Andrew Rose' s website 
Time zone difference  Time difference between financial centers of the 
countries in hours (in June). The variable ranges 
from 0 to 12. 
www.worldtimezone.com 
Control on bond 
transactions (inflow) 
Dummy variable=1 if there is a restriction on inflow 
transaction of bonds or other debt securities 
IMF' s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 
Control on bond 
transactions 
(outflow) 
Dummy variable=1 if there is a restriction on outflow 
transaction of bonds or other debt securities 
IMF' s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions 
LIBOR  London Interbank Offer Rate  IMF' s International Financial Statistics 
Interest rate  Treasury bill rate  IMF' s International Financial Statistics 
Exchange Rate  Bilateral (crossed) exchange rate  IMF' s International Financial Statistics 
Historical Bond Returns  Total bond return index--see text  Bloomberg 
Size of Banking Sector  Bank credit to private sector  IMF' s International Financial Statistics 
Size of Stock Market  Stock market capitalization  IMF' s International Financial Statistics 
Law and Order Risk  Political risk rating component on law and order  
(higher values means lower risks) 
International Country Risk Guide 
Corruption Risk  Political risk rating component on corruption  (higher 
values means lower risks) 
International Country Risk Guide 
Bureaucratic Quality  Political risk rating component on quality of 
bureaucracy (higher values means lower risks) 
International Country Risk Guide 
Investment Profile  Political risk rating component on assessment of 
investment risks  (higher values means lower 
risks) 
International Country Risk Guide 
Sovereign Credit 
Ratings 
Numerical variable ranging from 0-20; 0 is equivalent 
to the rating “default” and 20 is AAA 
Standard & Poor' s  
Legal origin  dummy variables identifying the legal origin of the 
company law or commercial code of each country. 
The five origins are English, French, German, 
Nordic and Socialist. 
Djankov et. al. (2005) 
Creditor' s rights  Index of creditor rights, ranging from 0 (weak) to 4 
(strong creditor rights) 
Djankov et. al. (2005) 
Contract enforcement  The number of days to resolve a payment dispute 
through courts 
Djankov et. al. (2005) 
Share of public bank 
assets 
Ratio of public commercial banks'  assets to total 
banking assets 
Micco, Panizza and Yañez (2004) and 
Bankscope 
Bank concentration  HHI index of commercial bank assets  Bankscope 
de facto exchange 
rate regime 
Reinhart-Rogoff de facto exchange rate regime 
classification 
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 
(2005) 
Phone traffics  Minutes of incoming and outgoing telephone traffics  International Telecommunication Union 
Phone costs  Costs of international call (US$ per 3 minutes in peak 
hours to USA; for USA to Europe) 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 
 